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1The Impact of Macroeconomic Uncertainty on
Non-Financial Firms’ Demand for Liquidity
Abstract
This paper empirically investigates whether changes in macroe-
conomic volatility aﬀect the eﬃcient allocation of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’
liquid assets. We argue that higher uncertainty will hamper managers’
ability to accurately predict ﬁrm-speciﬁc information and induce them
to implement similar cash management policies. Contrarily, when the
macroeconomic environment becomes more tranquil, each manager
will have the latitude to behave more idiosyncratically as she can ad-
just liquid assets based on the speciﬁc requirements of the ﬁrm, bring-
ing about a more eﬃcient allocation of liquid assets. Our empirical
analysis provides support for these predictions.
Keywords: Liquid assets, cash holdings, buﬀer stock, macroeconomic uncer-
tainty, ARCH, non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
JEL: E32, G31, M31.
21 Introduction
Non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ heavy reliance on liquid assets has presented researchers
with a number of interesting questions. Why do these ﬁrms hold cash far in
excess of transactions needs?1 How does ﬁrms’ demand for liquidity diﬀer
across categories of ﬁrms with similar characteristics? How does ﬁrms’ liquid
asset management respond to variations in broad economic conditions, and
uncertainty over the course of the economy? The sizable literature on ﬁrms’
liquid asset management addresses some of these questions, but has said very
little about their interaction with the level and volatility of macroeconomic
aggregates. This study seeks to address that deﬁciency.
Research focusing on the ﬁrst two questions above has made extensive
use of ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics such as leverage, growth opportunities,
cash ﬂow, and ﬁrm-level cash ﬂow uncertainty.2 They found that small, non-
rated ﬁrms, ﬁrms with strong investment opportunities, and those facing
more volatile cash ﬂows hold more cash. One can interpret these ﬁndings to
suggest that ﬁrms facing a high degree of asymmetric information are likely
to hold more liquid assets because of potential diﬃculties in their access
to external ﬁnancing. In addition to ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, macroeconomic
aggregates could be an important determinant of ﬁrms’ cash-holding behavior
and one that has received relatively little attention in previous research.
1We use cash and liquid assets synonymously, recognizing that some highly liquid assets
are almost indistinguishable from cash in terms of their liquidity.
2Papers of this genre include Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999), Faulk-
ender (2002), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) and
Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003). Also see Mikkelson and Partch (2003) who
investigate linkages between sizable cash holdings and ﬁrm performance.
3In this paper, we aim to contribute to the literature on corporate liq-
uidity by considering an additional factor which may have important eﬀects
on ﬁrms’ demand for liquidity. We argue that volatility in macroeconomic
conditions aﬀects managers’ determination of the appropriate level of liquid
asset holdings and distorts eﬃcient allocation of the ﬁrm’s resources.3 In
particular, we claim that higher uncertainty will hamper the ability of the
managers to accurately predict ﬁrm-speciﬁc information such as expected fu-
ture cash ﬂows, inducing managers to behave more homogeneously in terms
of their cash management policies. Contrarily, when the macroeconomic en-
vironment becomes more tranquil, each manager will have the latitude to
behave more idiosyncratically as she can adjust liquid assets based on the
speciﬁc requirements of the ﬁrm to bring about a more eﬃcient allocation
of scarce resources. Furthermore, given that managers of ﬁrms with diﬀer-
ing features (size, growth rate, access to ﬁnancial markets) will have quite
diﬀerent responses to changes in macroeconomic volatility, we also expect to
ﬁnd variations between groups of ﬁrms with respect to the strength of the
managerial response to changes in uncertainty. Overall, in this view, greater
stability of the macroeconomic environment will favor a more eﬃcient allo-
cation of liquid assets across ﬁrms.
The above argument implies that managers’ reactions to changes in macroe-
conomic uncertainty with respect to their demand for liquidity will generate
predictable variations in the cross-sectional distribution of corporate cash
holdings. To test these claims, we investigate whether changes in macroeco-
nomic uncertainty explain the time variation in the cross-sectional dispersion
of corporate cash holdings. We expect to ﬁnd that the cross-sectional disper-
3We use the terms macroeconomic volatility and uncertainty interchangeably in this
paper.
4sion of corporate cash holdings would narrow as increased macroeconomic
uncertainty hinders managers’ ability to accurately evaluate ﬁrm-speciﬁc in-
formation. Contrarily, a reduction in macroeconomic uncertainty would lead
to a more unequal distribution of cash holding behavior across ﬁrms as man-
agers take advantage of more accurate expectations of ﬁrm-speciﬁc informa-
tion. In other words, macroeconomic tranquility would lead to a widening of
the cross-sectional distribution of corporate cash holdings.
An investigation revealing the potential linkages between macroeconomic
uncertainty and ﬁrms’ demand for liquidity not only complements the cur-
rent literature on ﬁrms’ liquid asset holdings, but gives us another rationale
to promote macroeconomic stability to stimulate the eﬃcient allocation of
resources. Beaudry, Caglayan and Schiantarelli (2001) put this claim into
close empirical scrutiny by investigating the impact of aggregate price un-
certainty on the time-variation in the cross-sectional distribution of capital
investment spending at the aggregate and the industry level. Using UK
ﬁrm level data, they show that the cross-sectional distribution of investment
rate narrows during times of uncertainty, implying more homogeneous in-
vestment behavior across ﬁrms, whereas a reduction in inﬂation uncertainty
leads to a widening of the dispersion as higher-quality information allows
ﬁrms to invest in projects with diﬀering expected returns. Their ﬁndings
provide evidence that inﬂation uncertainty hinders the eﬃcient allocation of
ﬁrms’ capital funds. The approach we follow here is closely related to that
of Beaudry et al. as we test for the eﬀects of macroeconomic uncertainty on
ﬁrms’ allocation of liquid assets and argue that ﬁrms could forego potential
capital spending opportunities due to uncertainty over the macroeconomic
environment.
To ascertain the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on corporate cash
5holding behavior, we utilize a dataset obtained from the COMPUSTAT
database over the 1970–2000 period which provides us over 125,000 ﬁrm-
years, with an average of 4,125 non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms per annum. Empirical
analysis of these data yields a clear negative relationship between the variance
of the cross-sectional distribution of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ cash-to-asset ratios
and several proxies for uncertainty computed from ﬁnancial and macroe-
conomic variables, implying more homogeneous behavior among ﬁrms with
respect to their cash holdings in times of greater perceived volatility. In our
regression analysis, we incorporate several additional variables to gauge the
robustness of our ﬁndings and guard against potential misspeciﬁcation of the
model and we show that the eﬀects of uncertainty on the dispersion of cash
holdings is robust to inclusion of these variables.
In contrast to the more common approach which links the level (or the
changes) of individual ﬁrms’ cash holdings to various ﬁrm-speciﬁc character-
istics and explains the representative ﬁrm’s demand for liquidity, we provide
a method to understand the cash holding behavior of the cohort of ﬁrms
under scrutiny. In that sense, our approach is unique in the literature as we
concentrate on the distribution of corporate cash holdings to evaluate the
allocation of ﬁrms’ liquid assets. Yet, we should note that these two method-
ologies are not contradictory; rather, they are complementary analyses. The
rest of the paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 discusses the inﬂuence
of macroeconomic uncertainty on the optimal cash holdings of non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms. Section 3 describes the data and discusses our results. Finally, Section
4 concludes and gives suggestions for further research.
62 The demand for liquidity under uncertainty
Recent research (for instance, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and the references
therein) has emphasized the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics as a
determinant of ﬁrms’ cash-holding behavior. However, the macroeconomic
environment within which ﬁrms operate could be an equally important deter-
minant of their demand for liquidity. For instance, in March, 2001, Business
Week reported: “So with the economy stalling and fears of recession rising,
executives are becoming more concerned about protecting the cash they’ve
got. ‘People are more conservative than they were a year ago,’ says Charles
G. Ward III, co-head of investment banking at Credit Suisse First Boston.
‘CEOs and CFOs are making sure they have bank lines and cash, and they
want to make sure capital expenditures don’t outstrip their cash-raising capa-
bility.’ Adds Richard H. Brown, CEO of technology-services giant Electronic
Data Systems Corp.: ‘Cash is king now.’ ”4 This quotation suggests that
managers, ﬁnding it diﬃcult to gauge their ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂows in a con-
text of increasing macroeconomic uncertainty, may decide to implement sim-
ilar cash-management policies, placing a premium on liquidity. Conversely,
macroeconomic stability provides managers with the ability to forecast their
ﬁrms’ future cash ﬂows more accurately while giving them the latitude to
behave more idiosyncratically.
In their recent study Almeida et al. (2004) show that ﬁnancially con-
strained ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow sensitivity increases during recessions, while ﬁnan-
cially unconstrained ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow sensitivity is unaﬀected by the business
cycle. But to our knowledge, there is no study which explicitly considers the
4Citation: Business Week, 12 March 2001. “In Today’s Corporate America, Cash Is
King.” http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01 11/b3723021.htm.
7inﬂuence of macroeconomic uncertainty on ﬁrms’ demand for liquid assets
across a cohort of ﬁrms. In a nutshell, we argue that a non-ﬁnancial ﬁrm’s
manager would want to adjust her liquid asset holdings to minimize the ex-
pected costs of cash management, speciﬁcally in anticipation of variations
in macroeconomic shocks.5 However, if the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow is subject to
macroeconomic shocks, the optimal amount of cash holdings will crucially
depend on the manager’s perception of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information through the
veil of macroeconomic disturbances. Given that all managers are faced with
a similar problem to a greater or lesser degree, adjustments in liquid assets in
response to variations in the macroeconomic environment will in turn gener-
ate predictable variations in the cross-sectional distribution of corporate cash
holdings.6 In other words, extending the Beaudry et al. (2001) approach to
our setting, if managers’ perception of expected cash ﬂows crucially depends
on the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty, changes in macroeconomic un-
certainty will lead to time variations in the cross-sectional distribution of
5Our discussion draws upon models developed by Whalen (1966), Schnure (1998), and
Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980). Also see Cummins and Nyman (2004) who demonstrate
that ﬁrms facing a ﬁxed cost of acquiring external ﬁnance in an uncertain environment
will hold cash as a buﬀer against the need to borrow in later periods and Graham and
Harvey (2001) who emphasize the importance of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility (having enough inter-
nal ﬁnancing sources) when managers make ﬁnancing decisions to avoid curtailing their
business activities in response to macroeconomic shocks.
6Some authors (including Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998, p. 336); Harford (1999,
p.1969)) have suggested that “excess liquidity” may reﬂect a speculative motive, allowing
ﬁrms to take advantage of proﬁtable future investment opportunities when these ﬁrms face
higher costs of external ﬁnance.
8ﬁrms’ cash-to-asset ratios: an empirically testable hypothesis.7
2.1 Representation of the distribution of ﬁrms’ de-
mand for liquidity
In this section, we lay out the reduced form relationship that we will employ
to link changes in macroeconomic uncertainty to time variation in the cross-
sectional distribution of ﬁrms’ cash-to-total asset ratios. In doing so, our
main concern in this paper is not to test a speciﬁc model but to document
and verify the presence of an empirical relationship. To provide support
for the linkages between macroeconomic uncertainty and the cross-sectional
distribution of the cash-to-asset ratio, we consider the following reduced form
relationship:
Dispt(Cit/TAit) = β0 + β1τ
2
t + t, (1)
where Dispt(Cit/TAit) represents the cross-sectional dispersion of ﬁrms’ cash-
to-asset ratios, measured by the standard deviation of the cross-sectional
dispersion of ﬁrms’ cash-to-asset ratio at time t. τ2
t stands for the measure
of macroeconomic uncertainty at time t. We claim that the heterogene-
ity exhibited by non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ behavior will be negatively related to
macroeconomic uncertainty. Hence, we expect to ﬁnd a negative sign on β1
using U.S. non-ﬁnancial ﬁrm level data if greater macroeconomic uncertainty
were to be associated with a smaller dispersion of ﬁrms’ cash-to-asset ratios.
Furthermore, this argument should hold for sets of ﬁrms with similar char-
acteristics. Given extensive evidence from the ﬁnance and economics litera-
ture that managers of sets of ﬁrms with similar characteristics tend to behave
7Appendix C presents a simple partial-equilibrium framework showing how the empir-
ical model may be derived from the optimizing behavior of ﬁrms’ managers.
9similarly to one another, but diﬀerently from those with diﬀerent character-
istics, the impact of uncertainty on speciﬁc groups could be more pronounced
than on others. For instance, managers of those ﬁrms with more severe asym-
metric information problems might behave more conservatively during times
of heightened uncertainty than those with less asymmetric problems, as ﬁrms
with asymmetric information problems are shown to have limited access to
external ﬁnancing sources. In this context, we conjecture a strong negative
response of the cross-sectional dispersion of cash holdings for high-growth
ﬁrms and ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms to increases in macroeconomic un-
certainty whereas the responses of low-growth ﬁrms and unconstrained ﬁrms
would be less vigorous. Also, managers of capital intensive vs. labor intensive
manufacturing ﬁrms might be expected to behave diﬀerently as macroeco-
nomic uncertainty changes over time. We expect to see a stronger reaction
when we inspect capital intensive ﬁrms’ cash holding behavior with respect
to that of labor intensive ﬁrms due to the greater importance of adjustment
costs and irreversible investment in the former group. Hence, we analyze the
eﬀect of uncertainty for groups of ﬁrms deﬁned by their growth rates, capital
intensity in production or their being ﬁnancially constrained.
2.2 Identifying macroeconomic uncertainty
In order to test our hypothesis of a negative relationship between the cross-
sectional variance of ﬁrms’ cash-to-asset ratios and macroeconomic uncer-
tainty, we must provide a proxy that captures the state of the macroeconomy.
To ensure that our empirical ﬁndings are not an artifact of a single choice
of proxy, we construct four proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty from the
conditional variances of real gross domestic product, the index of industrial
production, the rate of consumer price inﬂation and returns on the S&P 500
10stockmarket index. Each of these measures captures diﬀerent elements of
the uncertainty perceived by ﬁrms’ managers relating to the macroeconomic
environment. Qualitatively similar ﬁndings across each of these proxies lend
strength to tests of our hypothesis.
The ﬁrst proxy employed is the conditional variance of a monthly measure
of real gross domestic product as a measure of overall macroeconomic activity.
Since GDP is only available at a quarterly frequency, the proxy is derived
from quarterly real GDP (International Financial Statistics series 99BRZF).
We generated the monthly GDP series via the proportional Denton procedure
dentonmq using the index of industrial production (which is available at a
monthly frequency) as an interpolating variable (see Baum, 2001).
The second proxy is derived from the monthly index of industrial pro-
duction itself (International Financial Statistics series 66IZF). This is a
narrrower measure, focusing on industrial activity and omitting the service-
sector activity which has become increasingly important to the US economy.
The third proxy, designed to pick up uncertainty related to nominal mag-
nitudes, is derived from the monthly rate of consumer price inﬂation (In-
ternational Financial Statistics series 64XZF). The last proxy, focused on
ﬁnancial market uncertainty, is derived from the monthly returns on Stan-
dard and Poor’s 500 share index (from CRSP Stockmarket Indices).
The conditional variances of each of these variables is estimated with a
generalized ARCH (GARCH) model, where the mean equation is a ﬁrst-order
11autoregression, allowing for ARMA errors.8,9 The speciﬁcs of the GARCH
models are provided in Appendix B. Each GARCH model’s estimated con-
ditional variance series, ˆ ht, is then employed in a revised version of equation
(1),
Dispt(Cit/TAit) = β0 + β1ˆ ht + t, (2)
where ˆ ht denotes the measure of macroeconomic uncertainty captured by the
conditional variances of real GDP, industrial production, CPI inﬂation and
S&P 500 returns, respectively, evaluated at time t. The advantage of this
approach is that we can relate the behavior of cash holdings directly to a
measure of macroeconomic uncertainty.10
8Alternatively, some researchers suggest using a moving standard deviation of the
macroeconomic series while others propose using survey-based measures based on the
dispersion of forecasts. The former approach suﬀers from substantial serial correlation
problems in the constructed series while the latter potentially contains sizable measure-
ment errors.
9Following a reviewer’s suggestion, we also tested an asymmetric ARCH model; results
(available from the authors) were qualitatively similar to those presented here.
10Since ˆ ht is a generated regressor, potentially measured with error, we employ a gen-
eralized method of moments (GMM) instrumental variables estimation technique. Tests
of the orthogonality of the generated regressor to the error (the “diﬀerence in Hansen J”
or “C” statistic: see Baum, Schaﬀer and Stillman (2003, pp. 20-24)) reject their null
hypothesis in almost every case. In contrast, the overidentifying restrictions are generally
accepted following the GMM-IV estimation.
123 Empirical ﬁndings
3.1 The data
The COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual database of U.S. non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms is
used to test our hypothesis. It covers on average 4,125 non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’
annual characteristics from 1970 to 2000. The ﬁrms are classiﬁed by four-digit
Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) code. We consider all ﬁrms outside
of one-digit codes 6 (ﬁnance, insurance and real estate) and 9 (government
enterprises), and two-digit code 49 (utilities). We utilize COMPUSTAT data
items Cash (data1) and Total Assets (data6) to construct the Cash-to-Asset
ratio. In order to evaluate the severity of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraints, we
compute the dividend payout ratio as data21
data13−data15−data16, where those data
items are deﬁned in the Appendix. It is important to note that unlike studies
at the level of the individual ﬁrm, our analysis is carried out in a panel
data context, where the unit of observation is taken to be the one-digit SIC
category, observed annually. Thus, the dispersion in the cash-to-asset ratio
is computed from the ﬁrms within each one-digit SIC category each year,
generating a maximum of 196 industry-year observations.
We apply a number of sample selection criteria on our original sample of
173,592 ﬁrm-years. First, we marked non-positive values of cash and total
assets as missing. Second, we considered that values of the cash-to-asset
ratio beyond three standard deviations from the mean were implausible; this
only aﬀected 5,352 ﬁrm-years, placing an eﬀective upper bound on the cash-
to-asset ratio of 0.72. Third, our model should be applied to ﬁrms who have
not undergone substantial changes in their composition during the sample
period (e.g., participation in a merger, acquisition or substantial divestment
should be disqualifying). Since we do not directly observe these phenomena,
13we calculate the growth rate of each ﬁrm’s real total assets, and trim the
annual distribution of this growth rate by the 10th and 90th percentiles to
remove ﬁrms exhibiting substantial changes in their scale. Fourth, we wish to
exclude ﬁrms in clear ﬁnancial distress or those facing substantial liquidity
constraints. We consider two consecutive years of negative cash ﬂows as
an indicator of these conditions. Where these appear, we remove them as
well as the prior and subsequent cash ﬂows from the sample. These screens
collectively reduced the sample to 127,929 ﬁrm-years.11 Descriptive statistics
for the annual means of cash-to-asset ratios are presented in Table 1. From
the means of the sample we see that ﬁrms hold over 10 percent of their total
assets in cash.
Note that in our analysis of subsamples of ﬁrms, we focus on the applica-
bility of the general model to a group of like ﬁrms rather than formally testing
for diﬀerences between groups of ﬁrms, which would necessitate the imposi-
tion of constraints across those groups. Furthermore, our groupings are not
mutually exhaustive, but designed to identify ﬁrms which are strongly clas-
siﬁed as, e.g., capital intensive or high-growth ﬁrms. Thus, a strategy based
on category indicators would not be appropriate, since many ﬁrms will not
fall in the group deﬁned by either extreme.
We place ﬁrms into high-growth and low-growth groups, deﬁning ﬁrms
as above the 75th percentile and below the 25th percentile of the annual
distribution of the growth in real total assets, respectively. As one expects
11Empirical results drawn from the full sample yielded qualitatively similar ﬁndings;
we prefer to use the screened data to reduce the potential impact of outliers upon the
parameter estimates. We also carried out the analysis using a longer data set covering the
period between 1950–2000. Obtained results were qualitatively similar to those we report
in this paper and are available from the authors.
14high-growth ﬁrms hold, on average, 3.6 percentage points more cash relative
to total assets than do low-growth ﬁrms.
We analyze the distinction between ﬁrms that might be considered ﬁ-
nancially constrained and those that might be considered ﬁnancially un-
constrained. Following the literature, we used the dividend payout ratio
as a measure of ﬁnancial stringency, deﬁning those ﬁrms which lay below
the 25th percentile of the annual distribution—or those ﬁrms paying zero
dividends—to be ﬁnancially constrained.12 We deﬁned those ﬁrms above the
75th percentile of the annual distribution of the dividend payout ratio to
be ﬁnancially unconstrained. We ﬁnd that the average cash-to-asset ratios
of ﬁnancially constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms diﬀer by 1.3 percentage
points, with the latter ﬁrms holding more cash.
We classify our manufacturing ﬁrms’ (sic2x and sic3x) factor utilization
as capital intensive or labor intensive. Using the NBER and U.S. Census Bu-
reau’s Center for Economic Studies (CES) database13 we classify a four-digit
SIC industry CAPITAL intensive if it has an average capital-to-labor ratio
above the 75th percentile and LABOR intensive if its average capital-to-labor
ratio is below the 25th percentile. The LABOR and CAPITAL categories of
ﬁrms hold similar amounts of cash relative to total assets, whether measured
by mean or median with little variation between each group.
12It is possible to use alternative criteria to measure ﬁnancial constraints as suggested
earlier in the literature. Due to space constraints we speciﬁcally concentrate on the div-
idend payout ratio. The idea that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly lower
payout ratios follows from Fazzari et al. (1988), among others.
13NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database, http://www.nber.org/nberces/, June
2000.
153.2 The link between cash holdings and uncertainty
Tables 2–8 present our regression results obtained for equation (2) for all
ﬁrms and three category splits (low and high growth ﬁrms, ﬁnancially con-
strained/unconstrained ﬁrms, and capital intensive/labor intensive ﬁrms, re-
spectively) in a one-digit SIC panel data context over the period between
1970–2000. In those tables, we present GMM (instrumental variables-generalized
method of moments) estimation results, where the macroeconomic uncer-
tainty proxies are weighted averages of lagged eﬀects.14 Instruments em-
ployed include the conditional variances of inﬂation, industrial production,
short-term interest rates, money growth and S&P 500 returns as well as a
linear time trend, appropriately modiﬁed for each proxy.
The four columns of each table present the results for the four proxies
for macroeconomic uncertainty (labelled in the column headings) in models
augmented with the level of CPI inﬂation and the three-month LIBOR rate
(LIBOR3mo) to proxy for the private cost of funds. These level variables
are included for robustness purposes to determine whether movements in the
cross-sectional distribution of ﬁrms’ cash-to-asset ratios might be driven by
the levels of macroeconomic variables. For each estimated model, we report
ˆ η, the estimated elasticities of the dispersion of the cash/asset ratio with re-
spect to the macroeconomic uncertainty proxy and the elasticities’ estimated
standard errors, labelled “s.e.”. Hansen’s J statistic, a test of overidentifying
restrictions in the IV-GMM setting, is also reported along with its p-value.
Although not reported for brevity, all models contain a constant term and
dummies for six of the seven included one-digit SIC categories (sicIx) to al-
14We imposed an arithmetic lag on the values of the proxy variable for periods t − 1,
t − 2 and t − 3, with weights 0.48, 0.34, 0.18, respectively, to capture the combined eﬀect
of contemporaneous and lagged uncertainty on cash holding behavior.
16low for diﬀerential baseline eﬀects of macroeconomic volatility across industry
groups.15
3.2.1 Results for all ﬁrms
Table 2 presents the relationship between the cross-sectional distribution
of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ cash-to-asset ratio and three proxies for macroeco-
nomic uncertainty for the full sample. In all cases the proxy coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcantly negative at the 5% or 1% level providing support for our hy-
pothesis that periods of heightened uncertainty lead to more homogeneous
cash-holdings behavior by ﬁrms. The sign of the coeﬃcient and its signiﬁ-
cance is robust to inclusion of additional regressors which one may consider
to have an impact on managers’ decision making process. To provide a bet-
ter insight, we compute the elasticities with respect to the macroeconomic
uncertainty measures for each model. We ﬁnd that for each speciﬁcation the
elasticity has a signiﬁcant magnitude: a 100% increase in uncertainty will
lead to a signiﬁcant decline in the dispersion of the cash-to-asset ratio, in a
range between 9% and 22%. These results bear out that ﬁrms will behave
much more homogeneously, in terms of their demand for liquid assets, in
times of greater uncertainty.
3.2.2 Results for subsamples of ﬁrms
Having established the negative impact of uncertainty on the cross-sectional
dispersion of the cash-to-asset ratio for the full sample, we next investigate
15Recall that we investigate the behavior of the cross-sectional dispersion of the cash-
to-asset ratio in an industry-year panel context. Thus, our methodology does not allow
for ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics in the estimated equation.
17if the strength of the association varies across groups of ﬁrms with diﬀering
characteristics such as growth rate, ﬁnancial constraints, and factor intensity.
Low-growth ﬁrms (reported in Table 3) are likely to be more mature
ﬁrms, perhaps those in declining industries. They do not exhibit any sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects of macroeconomic uncertainty, although the point estimates
are uniformly negative for the three proxies. In contrast, the impact of
macroeconomic uncertainty on high-growth ﬁrms (as reported in Table 4) is
uniformly signiﬁcant and somewhat larger than those of the “all ﬁrms” sam-
ple in Table 2. The eﬀect of a doubling of uncertainty on the cross-sectional
dispersion of the cash-to-asset ratio will be a reduction of approximately
16% for high-growth ﬁrms, versus about 14% for all ﬁrms. These ﬁndings
suggest that high-growth ﬁrms—likely to be younger ﬁrms with substantial
uncertainty about their near–term prospects, and facing a high degree of
asymmetric information—are more sensitive to macroeconomic factors than
the low-growth ﬁrms. Recall that the systematic risk associated with a ﬁrm’s
stock is related to growth opportunities, rendering the estimated hurdle rate
for capital investment by potential investors inaccurate (see for example My-
ers and Turnbull (1977)). Hence, it is reasonable to ﬁnd that fast-growing
ﬁrms’ access to external ﬁnance will be limited, requiring them to behave
more cautiously, particularly in times of higher macroeconomic uncertainty
which further deepens the informational asymmetries. In this context, our
results are broadly in line with previous ﬁndings; for instance, Harford (1999)
ﬁnds a positive relation between industry-level market-to-book (MB) ratios
and ﬁrms’ cash-to-asset ratios. He states that MB ratios are proxies for infor-
mation asymmetry, with high values observed in ﬁrms which derive much of
their market value from ﬁrm growth opportunities and intangibles (p. 1973).
In Tables 5 and 6, we investigate the eﬀects of uncertainty on ﬁnancially
18constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms. For the ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms,
the eﬀects of macroeconomic uncertainty are substantial, with signiﬁcant
estimated elasticities, whereas for the unconstrained ﬁrms macroeconomic
uncertainty does not appear to have any signiﬁcant eﬀect (although the point
estimates are uniformly negative). A 100% increase in uncertainty leads to
about a 13% reduction in the cross-sectional cash-to-asset ratio dispersion for
the ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms versus 7% for the unconstrained ﬁrms. This
result is also quite intuitive. As Almeida et al. (2004) indicate, ﬁnancially
unconstrained ﬁrms have no reason to hold extra cash; their cash holding
policies are indeterminate. Hence, an increase in uncertainty should not have
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the cross-sectional distribution of these ﬁrms’ cash-to-
asset ratios as the managers will react idiosyncratically to any change in the
macroeconomic environment. In contrast, for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms,
any change in the level of uncertainty which can aﬀect managers’ ability to
predict their cash ﬂows should cause them act more conservatively in concert
leading to a narrowing of the dispersion of their cash-to-asset ratios.
In summary, our ﬁndings suggest that constrained ﬁrms are more sensitive
to the impact of macroeconomic innovations in comparison to unconstrained
ﬁrms: a point also noted by Almeida et al. (2004) in section D of their
analysis.16
Low-growth ﬁrms, as noted above, are likely to be more mature, estab-
lished ﬁrms which may enjoy freedom from ﬁnancial constraints. Thus, we
16Almeida et al. (2004) speciﬁcally investigate the sensitivity of cash holdings to cash
ﬂows while carrying out their analysis in levels, i.e. ﬁrst moments. In contrast, we investi-
gate the impact of diﬀerent uncertainty measures on the cross-sectional dispersion of cash
holdings (second moments), and we do not speciﬁcally concentrate on the role of ﬁnancial
constraints.
19might consider the combination of these factors in our sample.17 However,
since our sample splits are not mutually exhaustive, very few ﬁrm-year ob-
servations are generated by ﬁrms with these combined characteristics. Of
the 154,344 ﬁrm-years in our sample, 29,710 (19.25%) are associated with
low-growth ﬁrms, while 35,782 ﬁrm-years (23.2%) are associated with ﬁnan-
cially unconstrained ﬁrms.18 Only 7,563 ﬁrm-years (4.9% of the sample) are
associated with low-growth, ﬁnancially-unconstrained ﬁrms. Thus, it is ev-
ident that our growth and ﬁnancial constraint classiﬁcations are measuring
diﬀerent characteristics of these non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
Finally, we report how capital-intensive vs. labor-intensive manufacturing
ﬁrms’ cash-to-asset ratio dispersion responds to macroeconomic uncertainty
in Tables 7 and 8, respectively.19 Similar to the previous set of results,
we obtain signiﬁcant and negative eﬀects for both ﬁrm classiﬁcations. For
each speciﬁcation reported in Table 7, the computed elasticities for capital-
intensive ﬁrms are substantially larger than those of labor-intensive ﬁrms.
While a 100% increase in uncertainty leads to an average 26% reduction in
the dispersion of the cash-to-asset ratio for capital-intensive ﬁrms, it only
causes a 17% decline in dispersion for labor-intensive ﬁrms (slightly larger
than the value for the “all ﬁrms” sample). This ﬁnding may indicate that
capital-intensive ﬁrms may not be as ﬂexible as labor-intensive ﬁrms due to
costs of adjustment of their capital stock. Contrarily, it may be easier for
17We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
18These percentages diﬀer from 25% due to screening applied to generate the estimation
sample.
19Recall that the data employed for this classiﬁcation utilize manufacturing ﬁrms (sic2x
and sic3x) only, for a total of 56 industry-year observations and a single one-digit industry
dummy.
20labor-intensive ﬁrms to adjust their operating costs in response to a cash ﬂow
shock.
3.2.3 Summary ﬁndings
In summary, these results support our claims that changes in macroeconomic
uncertainty lead to signiﬁcant time variations in the cross-sectional distribu-
tion of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ liquid asset holdings, measured by their cash-
to-asset ratios over and above the level eﬀect of macroeconomic variables.
These results are robust to the use of four diﬀerent measures of macroeco-
nomic uncertainty signalling increased uncertainty hampers eﬃcient use of
resources. Our results also carry to subsamples: the eﬀects of macroeconomic
uncertainty on ﬁrms’ liquidity are more pronounced for some categories of
ﬁrms than others while the relationship is always negative. Firms experi-
encing rapid growth, ﬁrms that might be considered ﬁnancially constrained
and capital-intensive ﬁrms are also found to be quite sensitive to macroeco-
nomic uncertainty. Firms that are paying sizable dividends exhibit a lower
sensitivity to these macro eﬀects, while capital-intensive ﬁrms’ sensitivity is
somewhat greater than that of labor-intensive ﬁrms. The overall message of
our analysis is that macroeconomic uncertainty is an important determinant
of corporate liquidity behavior, and the strength of that eﬀect systematically
diﬀers with respect to ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, distorting the eﬃcient use
of liquid assets.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we focus on the link between the dispersion of ﬁrms’ liquid asset
holdings and macroeconomic uncertainty using a panel of U.S. non-ﬁnancial
21ﬁrms drawn from the COMPUSTAT database over the period 1970–2000.
We argue that uncertainty about economic conditions should have clear ef-
fects on ﬁrms’ liquid asset management over and above the movements of
macroeconomic aggregates and would distort the eﬃcient allocation of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc resources. To that end, we investigate whether the presence of greater
macroeconomic uncertainty leads to a narrowing of the cross-sectional disper-
sion of ﬁrms’ cash-to-asset ratios, and conversely whether economic tranquil-
ity would provide ﬁrms with the latitude to behave more idiosyncratically,
leading to a widening of that dispersion.
To test this claim, we estimate a simple reduced-form equation using
an annual data set summarizing individual ﬁrms’ behavior at the industry
level and four proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty derived from GARCH
models ﬁtted to monthly macroeconomic and ﬁnancial data. On the basis of
our empirical analysis, there is clear evidence that changes in macroeconomic
uncertainty leads to time variation in the cross-sectional distribution of ﬁrms’
cash-to-asset ratios. Furthermore, we ﬁnd similar results when we investigate
subsamples while the total eﬀects of uncertainty are more pronounced for
some categories of ﬁrms than others in accordance with our priors. Overall,
we show that a doubling of uncertainty (depending on ﬁrm characteristics)
would lead to an 8% to 40% reduction in the dispersion of non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms’ cash-to-asset ratios. These ﬁgures are most extraordinary. Last but
not least, our results are robust to the inclusion of macroeconomic factors
that capture the state of the economy.
Taking the current evidence along with the ﬁndings reported by Beaudry,
Caglayan and Schiantarelli (2001) and Baum, Caglayan and Ozkan (2004)
who document that an increase in macroeconomic uncertainty could lead
to a signiﬁcant reduction in the cross-sectional dispersion of the investment
22rate and banks’ loan-to-asset ratios, respectively, it is clear that macroeco-
nomic uncertainty leads to signiﬁcant distortions in the eﬃcient allocation
of ﬁrms’ resources between capital spending and short-term liquidity needs.
Our paper, along with many others, strongly implies that the overall im-
pact of reducing macroeconomic uncertainty would be quite beneﬁcial to the
economy and that the second moments of macroeconomic aggregates should
be of key concern to economic policymakers.
23Appendix A
Construction of cash holdings and uncertainty measures
The following variables are used in the empirical study.
From Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT database:
DNUM: Industry Classiﬁcation Code
DATA1: Cash Holdings
DATA6: Total Assets




From IMF International Financial Statistics:
66IZF: Industrial Production monthly
64XZF: Consumer Price Inﬂation
99BRZF: GDP at 1996 prices
60EAZF: Three-month LIBOR
From CRSP Stock Market Indices:
S&P 500 Monthly Returns
24Appendix B
GARCH proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty20
log(Real GDP) log(IndProdn) CPI Inflation S&P 500
Lagged dep.var. 0.986 0.981 0.989
(0.01)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Constant 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.007
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)***
AR(1) -0.981 0.808 0.285 0.907
(0.01)*** (0.07)*** (0.04)*** (0.07)***
AR(2) -0.918
(0.07)***




ARCH(1) 0.123 0.292 0.089 0.019
(0.03)*** (0.05)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)***
ARCH(2) 0.126 -0.204
(0.03)*** (0.05)***
GARCH(1) -0.187 0.889 0.872 1.805
(0.05)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.01)***
GARCH(2) 0.814 -0.839
(0.05)*** (0.04)***
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00)*** (0.00)** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Loglikelihood 1937.89 1860.48 2809.59 897.58
Observations 535 535 641 504
OPG standard errors in parentheses
Models are ﬁt to detrended log(Real GDP), detrended log(IndProdn), CPI inﬂation and S&P 500 returns.
** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
20Unsurprisingly, the initial model for stock returns did not contain a statistically sig-
niﬁcant autoregressive term, so it was reestimated without a lagged dependent variable.
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A simple cash buﬀer-stock model
Below we provide a one period model, which is a variant of the island
model used by Lucas (1973), highlighting the manager’s cash holding decision
as a signal extraction problem.
Each period, ﬁrm i receives an uncertain amount of net cash ﬂow between
time t and t+1, drawn from a uniform distribution with an upper bound H
and a lower bound, L = −H. The manager of the ﬁrm would want to hold
an optimal amount of cash buﬀer at a cost of r1 percent for precautionary
reasons. A negative cash ﬂow shock that exceeds current cash holdings re-
quires the ﬁrm to borrow from an external source to meet its obligations at
a higher interest rate of r2 percent. We assume that r2 > r1, and possibly
r2 >> r1 due to ﬁnancial frictions. A ﬁrm holding a cash buﬀer of Ci faces
the following three possible outcomes.
i) With probability P1 = H
2H = 1
2, the net cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm could be
positive; the ﬁrm merely incurs the opportunity cost of holding Ci
1
COST1 = Cir1. (C.1)
ii) The ﬁrm could face a negative cash shock (CFi) of a magnitude up to Ci
with probability of P2 =
Ci
2H, rendering the cost of replenishment as well as
cost of holding the cash buﬀer:




iii) To remain solvent, a negative shock greater than Ci, may force the ﬁrm
to borrow from an external source at the gross interest rate (1 + r2) with a
probability of P3 =
H−Ci
2H :
COST3 = Cir1 + Ci − (E(CFi| − H < CFi < −Ci) + Ci)(1 + r2) =




(1 + r2). (C.3)
1Any unused cash is assumed to be distributed back to the shareholders.
26Given all scenarios expressed in equations (C.1–C.3), the manager min-
imizes total expected cost, ECOST = COST1P1 + COST2P2 + COST3P3,




(r2 − 2r1). (C.4)
Provided that r2 > 2r1, the ﬁrm will have positive cash holdings. How-
ever, if the bounds of the distribution were to be hit by a random shock
i,t representing an uncertainty of the net disbursements that each ﬁrm faces
where i,t ∼ N(0,σ2
,t) then the managers’ perception of the expected cash
ﬂows that will prevail becomes important. Assume that the manager of each
ﬁrm observes a noisy signal in the form of Si,t = i,t+νt, where νt ∼ N(0,σ2
ν,t)
and independent of i,t. In this context the noise in the signal, νt, reﬂects
macroeconomic uncertainty.
Conditioning upon the signal Si,t, the manager forms an optimal forecast






that the ﬁrm manager cannot observe σ2
ν,t, but rather that she may form an
optimal forecast of that quantity. Therefore, substituting for Et(Hi,t|Si,t) =
H + λtSi,t, we can modify equation (C.4) as:
E(Ci,t|Si,t) = (H + λtSi,t)(
r2 − 2r1
r2
) = kH + kλtSi,t, (C.5)
where k = (r2−2r1
r2 ). As the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty (σ2
ν,t)
increases, the manager’s ability to predict cash ﬂow will diminish, aﬀecting
the optimal level of cash holdings.
Finally, using equation (C.5) we may examine the cross-sectional distri-


















ν,t)2 < 0. (C.7)
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30Table 1: Annual Cash/Asset ratios: Descriptive statistics, 1970–2000
µ σ p25 p50 p75 N
All ﬁrms 0.105 0.014 0.091 0.107 0.117 127,302
Low–growth ﬁrms 0.085 0.008 0.078 0.084 0.090 25,923
High–growth ﬁrms 0.121 0.025 0.099 0.125 0.147 25,871
Financially constrained ﬁrms 0.107 0.018 0.088 0.112 0.122 64,546
Unconstrained ﬁrms 0.094 0.008 0.089 0.093 0.101 29,869
Capital–intensive ﬁrms 0.102 0.110 0.026 0.062 0.138 38,113
Labor–intensive ﬁrms 0.102 0.115 0.025 0.059 0.138 32,428
Note: p25, p50 and p75 represent the quartiles of the distribution, while µ and σ
represent its mean and standard deviation. N refers to the number of ﬁrm–years
of data in each category which have been collapsed into 196 observations,
identiﬁed by year and one–digit SIC category (56 observations for capital– and
labor–intensive categories).
31Table 2: Dispersion of Cash/Asset ratio for all ﬁrms 1970–2000
GDP IndProdn Inﬂ SPRetn
uncert -40.860** -19.620*** -92.381* -115.218**
(12.919) (5.842) (36.935) (35.144)
Inﬂation -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LIBOR3mo 0.298*** 0.217*** 0.158** 0.139*
(0.073) (0.060) (0.057) (0.055)
Ind–years 196 196 196 196
ˆ η -0.171 -0.114 -0.089 -0.221
s.e. 0.054 0.034 0.036 0.067
J 9.237 8.095 9.421 6.743
J pvalue 0.100 0.088 0.051 0.150
HAC IV-GMM estimates, based on 127302 ﬁrm-year obs.
∗ <10%, **<5%, ***< 1%
32Table 3: Dispersion of Cash/Asset ratio for low–growth ﬁrms 1970–2000
GDP IndProdn Inﬂ SPRetn
uncert -31.870 -11.763 -30.011 -40.675
(16.666) (7.973) (49.839) (40.255)
Inﬂation -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LIBOR3mo 0.202* 0.131 0.104 0.086
(0.095) (0.082) (0.081) (0.081)
Ind–years 196 196 196 196
ˆ η -0.157 -0.080 -0.034 -0.092
s.e. 0.082 0.055 0.057 0.092
J 5.898 7.146 7.242 4.312
J pvalue 0.316 0.128 0.124 0.365
HAC IV-GMM estimates, based on 25923 ﬁrm-year obs.
∗ <10%, **<5%, ***< 1%
Table 4: Dispersion of Cash/Asset ratio for high–growth ﬁrms 1970–2000
GDP IndProdn Inﬂ SPRetn
uncert -50.828** -24.455** -138.271** -96.542*
(16.511) (7.758) (49.626) (45.148)
Inﬂation -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LIBOR3mo 0.272** 0.193** 0.102 0.104
(0.085) (0.075) (0.075) (0.066)
Ind–years 196 196 196 196
ˆ η -0.207 -0.138 -0.130 -0.182
s.e. 0.066 0.044 0.046 0.084
J 7.979 6.250 6.968 9.858
J pvalue 0.157 0.181 0.138 0.043
HAC IV-GMM estimates, based on 25871 ﬁrm-year obs.
∗ <10%, **<5%, ***< 1%
33Table 5: Dispersion of Cash/Asset ratio for ﬁn. constr. ﬁrms 1970–2000
GDP IndProdn Inﬂ SPRetn
uncert -31.971* -15.410* -81.423 -119.982**
(15.726) (7.077) (44.646) (43.218)
Inﬂation -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LIBOR3mo 0.438*** 0.377*** 0.318*** 0.304***
(0.090) (0.080) (0.078) (0.075)
Ind–years 196 196 196 196
ˆ η -0.130 -0.087 -0.076 -0.222
s.e. 0.064 0.040 0.042 0.080
J 11.473 10.828 11.006 6.408
J pvalue 0.043 0.029 0.026 0.171
HAC IV-GMM estimates, based on 64546 ﬁrm-year obs.
∗ <10%, **<5%, ***< 1%
Table 6: Dispersion of Cash/Asset ratio for ﬁn. unconstr. ﬁrms 1970–2000
GDP IndProdn Inﬂ SPRetn
uncert -17.432 -6.140 -40.742 -58.947
(12.459) (5.689) (33.922) (35.613)
Inﬂation -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LIBOR3mo 0.036 -0.005 -0.027 -0.022
(0.067) (0.065) (0.069) (0.068)
Ind–years 196 196 196 196
ˆ η -0.078 -0.038 -0.042 -0.121
s.e. 0.056 0.035 0.035 0.073
J 1.331 0.745 1.328 0.296
J pvalue 0.932 0.946 0.857 0.990
HAC IV-GMM estimates, based on 29869 ﬁrm-year obs.
∗ <10%, **<5%, ***< 1%
34Table 7: Dispersion of Cash/Asset ratio for capital–intensive ﬁrms 1970–2000
GDP IndProdn Inﬂ SPRetn
uncert -66.183*** -31.444*** -168.341** -183.774**
(19.809) (8.516) (62.195) (60.982)
Inﬂation -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LIBOR3mo 0.330** 0.183 0.094 0.032
(0.119) (0.099) (0.101) (0.098)
Ind–years 56 56 56 56
ˆ η -0.312 -0.203 -0.181 -0.392
s.e. 0.094 0.055 0.068 0.128
J 4.821 3.588 3.144 3.874
J pvalue 0.438 0.465 0.534 0.423
HAC IV-GMM estimates, based on 38113 ﬁrm-year obs.
∗ <10%, **<5%, ***< 1%
Table 8: Dispersion of Cash/Asset ratio for labor–intensive ﬁrms 1970–2000
GDP IndProdn Inﬂ SPRetn
uncert -42.877* -21.330* -86.476 -148.665*
(21.119) (8.775) (63.613) (61.529)
Inﬂation -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LIBOR3mo 0.414** 0.334** 0.283* 0.241*
(0.126) (0.118) (0.125) (0.115)
Ind–years 56 56 56 56
ˆ η -0.195 -0.132 -0.090 -0.303
s.e. 0.096 0.054 0.066 0.123
J 4.920 4.196 4.616 1.848
J pvalue 0.426 0.380 0.329 0.764
HAC IV-GMM estimates, based on 32428 ﬁrm-year obs.
∗ <10%, **<5%, ***< 1%
35